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CAN 10b-5 FOR THE BANKS? THE EFFECT OF
AN ANTIFRAUD RULE ON THE REGULATION
OF BANKS*
MICHAEL P. MALLOY*
In this Article, Professor Malloy explores the effects of the federal securities an-
tifraud rule on the regulation of banks. In particular, he focuses on the changes
in regulation of commercial bank trust department activities that followed the
revelations in Texas Gulf Sulphur of alleged tipping between the commercial and
trust departments of a major New York bank He also argues that federal bank
regulatory policy has now turned away from disclosure-oriented regulation in
favor of capital supervision, and that this may be a mistaken approach to the
regulation of banking.
INTRODUCTION
Ecr'HEworld of banking remains a mysterious realm in which credit is
Lcreated by the transformation of deposits, many times over, into
loans, which themselves are transformed into deposits.' Since the begin-
ning of the Republic, this "credit function" has attracted much attention
from policymakers, evincing both positive and negative reactions.2
* Copyright © 1993 Michael P. Malloy. This Article is a longer version of an
address delivered to the Graduate Colloquium, Fordham University School of Law, in
January 1993. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Fordham
University School of Law, which funded research in connection with this Article during
the Summer 1992. Portions of the material in this Article will also appear in a future
supplement to Michael P. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks (2 vols., 1988).
** Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Fordham University School
of Law. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1976; Ph.D., Georgetown University, 1983.
1. For a description of this "credit function," see Michael P. Malloy, The Regula-
tion of Banking 381 (1992); see also Frederic S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money,
Banking, and Financial Markets 262-70 (2d ed. 1989).
2. This controversy can be seen in its purest form in the Hamilton-Jefferson debate
over the proposal to create the First Bank of the United States. Hamilton included the
following among the many benefits to be derived from strengthening the banking system
by the creation of a central bank:
The augmentation of the active or productive capital of a country.... (Wihen
[gold and silver are] deposited in banks, to become the basis of a paper circula-
tion, which takes their character and place, ... they then acquire life, or, in
other words, an active and productive quality .... It is a well established fact,
that banks in good credit, can circulate a far greater sum than the actual quan-
tum of their capital in gold and silver.
Alexander Hamilton, Treasury Report on a National Bank, Dec. 13, 1790, reprinted in I
American State Papers [Class III] 67-68. Jefferson's reaction to this claimed advantage
was dismissive:
The report.., states the only general convenience [of the creation of a na-
tional bank] to be preventing the transportation and re-transportation of money
between the States and the treasury, (for I pass over the increase of circulating
medium, ascribed to it as a merit, and which, according to my ideas of paper
money, is clearly a demerit).
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion, Feb. 15, 1791, reprinted in Documentary History of Banking
and Currency in the United States 147 (H. E. Kross ed., 1969 ed.) (emphasis in original).
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Policymakers have raised many questions concerning the function of
banks within the economy, including whether banks can sustain the
credit function over time3 and whether they can maintain public confi-
dence in their safety and soundness.4 An equally pressing question exists
in the intersection between banking regulation and securities regulation:
can lOb-5 for the banks?
This question may seem somewhat cryptic. In more straightforward
terms, it asks the following: what effect have the antifraud requirements
of Rule lOb-55 had on the regulation of banks? The answer to this
question reveals some interesting features of the peculiar intersection of
the federal regimes of banking and securities regulation.
With the first major flowering of the Rule lOb-5 regime in the after-
math of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company ("TGS"),6 bank regulatory policy and practice faced a poten-
tial crisis concerning the implications of the generally applicable
antifraud rule for the practices of banks. Nevertheless, the antifraud rule
was assimilated into the regulations of the federal banking agencies7 in a
3. The inability to sustain this function has been the cause of the failure or near-
failure of many banks. See, e.g., Continental Illinois: How Bad Judgments and Big Egos
Did It In, Wall St. J., July 30, 1984, at 1 (significant deposit withdrawal demands and
improvident lending creating conditions of collapse).
4. Safety and soundness is a central concept in bank supervision. See Michael P.
Malloy, Balancing Public Confidence and Confidentiality: Adjudication Practices and
Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 61 Temple L. Rev. 723, 769-74
(1988) (discussing the concept). The safety and soundness concept has also received re-
newed legislative attention. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 132(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2267 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831s (Supp. III 1991)) (standards for safety and soundness).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). Rule lOb-5 states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
6. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
7. This Article uses the term "federal banking agencies" generically to refer to the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") (the principal regulator of national
banks), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Fed") (the principal
federal regulator of state-chartered, Fed-member banks, and of bank holding companies),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") (the principal federal regulator of
state-chartered, non-Fed-member, FDIC-insured banks and the administrator of the fed-
eral deposit insurance funds), and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") (the principal
federal regulator of savings associations and of savings and loan holding companies). See
12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (Supp. III 1991) (defining the roles of the federal banking agencies).
For an extended discussion of the roles and authority of the federal banking agencies, see
1 Michael P. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks 21-60 (1988 & Cum. Supp.).
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way that may have blunted its significance. In addition, the federal bank
regulatory policy decisively turned away from the techniques of
securities regulation' and toward a regime of capital supervision.9
Part I of this Article examines the potential crisis for bank regulatory
policy implicit in the Second Circuit's decision in TGS, which raised
questions concerning the validity of interrelationships between the trust
and commercial loan departments of a commercial bank. Part II ana-
lyzes federal securities law principles as assimilated into federal bank reg-
ulation. Part III reviews the ways capital supervision has emerged as the
central focus of federal bank regulatory policy on banks'0 as securities-
issuing entities. This Article concludes that the current preoccupation
with capital supervision, over the concerns of securities regulation, is
misplaced and leaves open the possibility that Rule lOb-5 will continue to
be an important consideration for banking enterprises.
I. TGS AND THE POTENTIAL CRISIS FOR BANK
REGULATORY POLICY
A. A Paradigm Shift in Regulatory Treatment of Bank
Trust Departments
The Second Circuit's 1968 TGS decision marked an important turning
point in the development of the law and lore of Rule lOb-5.1 Indeed,
TGS effected so complete a "paradigm shift"'2I in the way we think about
8. Indeed, it may be argued that the federal banking agencies have never, as an
institutional matter, been comfortable with securities regulation techniques. See. e.g.,
Michael P. Malloy, Public Disclosure as a Tool of Federal Bank Regulation, 9 Ann. Rev.
Banking L. (1990) [hereinafter Public Disclosure] (arguing that public disclosure tech-
niques stand in contrast to typical bank regulatory techniques); Michael P. Malloy, The
12(i)'ed Monster: Administration of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the Federal
Bank Regulatory Agencies, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 269 (1990) [hereinafter 12(i)'ed Monster]
(criticizing the agencies' administration of federal securities laws).
9. The term "capital supervision" refers to regulatory requirements imposed with
the objective of "maintaining capital adequacy of [depository] institutions." Malloy,
supra note 7, at 409.
10. While the major focus of this Article is on federal regulation of commercial
banks, parallels will be cited with respect to the regulation of savings associations-i.e.,
consumer-oriented depository institutions that share many of the features of banks. For a
study on commercial banks and savings associations as types of "depository institutions"
subject to similar regulatory regimes, see Malloy, supra note 7, at 5-8 (1988 & Cum.
Supp.).
11. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule lOb-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 62 Fordham L.
Rev. S7, S12 (1993) (discussing shift in thinking about lOb-5 marked by the TGS
decision).
12. The term "paradigm shift" is borrowed from the philosophy of science, as devel-
oped in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970), yet Kuhn
himself invites the analogy between the experience of scientific research and the develop-
ment of legal principles. Kuhn writes:
In a science,.. . a paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an
accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articula-
tion and specification under new or more stringent conditions.
Id. at 23. Paradigms define not only the accepted framework of theory within which
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the concept of insider trading, that it now appears to have entered that
exalted category of "most often cited, least often read" cases. To under-
stand the potential crisis it raised for bank regulatory policy, we need to
recreate the impact TGS had at the time of its decision.
First, let us recall certain well-received, common law presuppositions.
Fraud is reprehensible (and actionable) at traditional common law. In its
most general terms, "fraud" means a situation in which a plaintiff has
justifiably relied, to his or her detriment, upon a false representation of a
material fact made by a defendant who had knowledge of the falsity and
intended that the plaintiff rely upon it. 3 In the straightforward world of
direct, face-to-face transactions, this rule seems to satisfy intuitively the
natural desire to order human interactions in a manner that minimizes
conflict. Suppose Ms. D tells Mr. P that a certain scientific process she
has perfected will accelerate the aging process of new brandy into a ma-
ture and superior brandy. She knows that the process is a clever fake
with which she intends to trick Mr. P into parting with a large sum of
money. If Mr. P reasonably relies upon Ms. D's representations and
parts with the sum, 4 Mr. P will have a viable cause of action against Ms.
D for his damage. Alternatively, if instead of selling the process, Ms. D
sells to Mr. P stock in the company that owns the process, Mr. P will
also have a cause of action in fraud or deceit for his damage.II
One challenge to this paradigm arises if we assume that Ms. D has said
nothing to Mr. P on the subject, though she knows that the process is
fake and that Mr. P thinks otherwise. The common law stumbled over
this situation because it did not suit the paradigmatic scenario presup-
posed by the basic common law rule concerning fraud. 6 Under the so-
called majority rule, a nondisclosing defendant possessing material infor-
science proceeds, but also the instrumental means of achieving experimental results (that
is, not only how data is to be interpreted, but also how instruments are to be used). When
anomalies are identified, they carry the potential for raising questions about the underly-
ing paradigm itself. This situation may result in a crisis, as described by Kuhn:
All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm and the consequent loosening of
the rules for normal research.... [A]ll crises close in one of three ways. Some-
times normal science [(i.e., science proceeding under the current paradigm)]
ultimately proves able to handle the crisis-provoking problem .... On other
occasions the problem resists even apparently radical new approaches.... Or,
finally,... a crisis may end with the emergence of a new candidate for para-
digm and with the ensuing battle over its acceptance.
Id. at 84. It is this third case that leads to a paradigm shift. The significance of a para-
digm shift lies in the fact that it changes not only a theory but the approach to problems
yet to be confronted. "[W]hen paradigms change, there are usually significant shifts in
the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solutions." Id.
at 109.
13. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 728 (5th ed.
1984).
14. Cf. Margery Allingham, The Widow, in Mr. Campion and Others 1-24 (1991)
(offering a fictional account of such a scheme).
15. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (cause of
action for fraud under Rule lob-5 for purchaser of securities).
16. See Keeton et al., supra note 13, at 737.
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mation generally has no affirmative duty of disclosure or fairness to an
unsuspecting purchaser or seller. 17 This rule stands in contrast to a de-
cidedly minority rule that imposes a fiduciary duty of disclosure on cor-
porate managers or insiders purchasing shares from a current
shareholder of the subject corporation."8 Splitting the difference between
these two rules, 19 and perhaps highlighting the strain on the paradigm
caused by intuitively sympathetic cases that do not fit the traditional
scenario presupposed by the common law rule, is the so-called special
facts doctrine. This doctrine allows recovery to a plaintiff-seller if the
information undisclosed by the corporate insider involves "special cir-
cumstances or facts... mak[ing] it inequitable for the [insider] to with-
hold information."'2
In making the transition from traditional common law rules concern-
ing fraud to federal securities law, one must consider how, if at all, the
general contours of the former should determine the shape of the latter.2 '
"In civil actions instituted on the basis of 10b-5 violations, the keynote of
which is fraud, the full panoply of common law fraud elements... have
crept in and played varying roles of significance."'  However, the para-
digmatic crisis, which was ultimately resolved by TGS, involved the spe-
cific question of whether "pure" nondisclosure should be actionable in
the insider trading context under Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether it is
open to question as a matter of common law.
The TGS answer that "pure" nondisclosure should be actionable in the
insider trading context 23 -raised questions concerning the validity of in-
terrelationships between the trust and commercial loan departments of a
bank. TGS also challenged certain presuppositions about the way stock
trading institutions conducted their operations. In his study of the J. P.
Morgan banking enterprise, Ron Chernow described the challenge to
these presuppositions in the following terms:
17. See, eg., Connolly v. Shannon, 147 A. 234 (NJ. Ch. 1929) (applying traditional
rule), aff'd, 151 A. 905 (1930). But cf Keeton et al., supra note 13, at 738-39 (confiden-
tial or fiduciary relationship between buyer and seller results in liability in nondisclosure
situation).
18. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wright, 159 P.2d 980 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (imposing
liability on fiduciary); Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903) (same).
19. One commentator has argued that the "special facts" rule has been generally ap-
plied in order to merge the majority rule into the minority rule. See 7 Louis Loss & Joel
Seligman, Securities Regulation 3474 (3d ed. 1991). But see Sherwood E. Sterling,
"Wherefore Art Thou, Fiduciary?" The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Common Law Fiduciary Duty of the Director, 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 410, 422 (1963) (dis-
puting this conclusion).
20. American Trust Co. v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 98 P.2d 497, 504 (Cal.
1940); accord Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1909) (holding that duty to dis-
close may exist in special cases, depending on the facts).
21. For an excellent approach to the problem of transition from a common law re-
gime to a federal regulatory regime, see Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90,
97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
22. Id.
23. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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[N]ew fears about insider trading... took the banks by surprise. In
the twenties, fortunes had been made through whispered tips and sly
winks. The public tolerated this because only a tiny percentage of
them owned stock. As personal investing grew in the 1950s and early
1960s, the public didn't wish to take part in a rigged game. It took
time for the banks to perceive the danger, or at least the new public
apprehension. In the 1960s, trust departments weren't yet segregated
from other departments. At [Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.], senior
bank officers-many of them directors of five or ten companies-sat on
the Trust Committee, which also had as members outside directors of
the bank . . . . These men were expected to bring their specialized
knowledge to bear in picking stocks [for the Trust Department]. At
that point, banks didn't worry that they might misuse confidential in-
formation from the lending side in making investment decisions [for
the Trust Department]; there weren't yet legal barriers, or "Chinese
walls," between the commercial and the trust departments.24
TGS was not simply an abstract precedent with implications for banks.
In fact, it directly enmeshed Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
("Morgan"), one of the major New York banks. The pedigree is as fol-
lows. Thomas S. Lamont, a partner at Morgan, was also a director on
the board of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company ("TGS"), and had been since
1927.25 He had regularly recommended the purchase of TGS's stock to
Morgan's trust department.26 In November 1963, TGS discovered an
important mineral lode, and from that point until mid-April 1964, it at-
tempted to quiet reports of the discovery.27 On April 16, 1964, TGS held
a board meeting and press conference to announce the discovery, both of
which Mr. Lamont attended. The head of Morgan's trust department
asked Mr. Lamont to inform him of the results of the proceedings.2"
What followed resembles a law professor's hypothetical problem. It is
well described by Mr. Chernow:
The [TGS] meeting began at nine sharp, with a full complement of
fifteen directors. At about ten o'clock, twenty reporters were herded in
for a press conference.... The company wanted to keep all reporters
in the room until the press conference was over. But once [TGS presi-
dent] Claude Stephens finished his announcement [of the discovery], [a
reporter for Merrill Lynch's monthly magazine] managed to slip out a
side door. She got the news on the firm's in-house network at 10:29
A.M. A reporter for a Canadian wire service got out another door.
Meanwhile, the other reporters stayed put, forced to watch color slides
24. Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan 562 (1990).
25. See id. at 563.
26. See id.
27. For a discussion of the factual background of this case, see SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843-47 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Chernow, supra note 24, at 563-
64 (discussing factual background of TGS). For a report of the litigation triggered by the
efforts of TGS to quiet reports of the discovery, see Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,
446 F.2d 90, 93-96 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
28. See Chernow, supra note 24, at 563.
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of the ore deposit. At the first moment of freedom, they dashed to the
telephones to report the sensational news. [It] appeared on the Dow
Jones "broad tape" of market news at 10:55 A.M.
After the meeting, Lamont mingled with reporters, viewing core
samples and color slides .... About 10:40 A.M., he phoned [Street
Hinton, head of the Morgan trust department,] from the [TGS] offices.
"Take a look at the ticker," Lamont said. "There is an interesting
announcement coming over about [TGS]." "Is it good?" Hinton
asked. "Yes, it's good," Lamont said.... In fact, [Hinton] failed to
verify that it had appeared.... He at once telephoned the trading desk
and bought three thousand [TGS] shares for the [Nassau Hospital As-
sociation, whose portfolio he ran personally]. Then he advised
[Morgan portfolio manager] Peter Vermilye to add the stock to a
Morgan Guaranty profit-sharing plan and a mixed fund that invested
for two hundred pension plans; Vermilye bought one thousand and six
thousand shares respectively. All the while, the story hadn't shown up
on the Dow Jones broad tape, even though it had been flashed to 159
Merrill Lynch branches....
Lamont returned to his office.., and at 12:33 P.M. bought three
thousand [TGS] shares for himself and his family.... Only twelve
days later did Lamont learn of the Trust Department purchases trig-
gered by his call. He hadn't advised Hinton to buy. He later claimed
he was discharging a duty and not phoning in a hot tip.
29
The Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") charged La-
mont, along with twelve other TGS insiders and tippees, with insider
trading. The District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the charges against eleven of the defendants, including Lamont,
on the grounds that the material information on which their trading was
based was already public at the time of the trades.30 The SEC appealed,
but in April 1967, Lamont died after undergoing heart surgery. 3' The
parties to the appeal agreed to a discontinuance of the case against him,
but the appeal continued to a conclusion with the Second Circuit's
decision.32
This resolution was no comfort to the banking world in the wake of
the TGS crisis. "However misguided in its pursuit of Lamont, the SEC
in [TGS] drew attention to the growing dangers of financial conglomera-
tion .... As both commercial and investment banks developed huge,
diversified operations, it would be increasingly difficult for them to segre-
gate diverse and often legally incompatible operations." 33 TGS decisively
called into question previously accepted practices in which banks implic-
itly traded on their key role as financial intermediaries, intermingling
29. Id. at 564-65 (footnote omitted).
30. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
31. See Chernow, supra note 24, at 567.
32. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 842 n.6 (2d Cir. 1968).
33. Chernow, supra note 24, at 567.
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their commercial lending and advising with the fiduciary activities per-
formed by their trust operations.
In a key strategic move, the Second Circuit blurred completely the fine
distinctions of the common law rules concerning fraud.34 In the court's
view, it seemed almost irrelevant where, if at all, a specific duty arose
preventing insiders from trading on the basis of nondisclosed, material
inside information. The court stated: "Whether predicated on tradi-
tional fiduciary concepts or on the 'special facts' doctrine, [Rule IOb-5] is
based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information. '35
The assertion of this "justifiable expectation" was probably counterfac-
tual,36 at least until the Second Circuit had introduced it.37 Nevertheless,
the court extended the "equal access" rule beyond statutory insiders (di-
rectors, officers, and over-ten-percent shareholders) 3 to include such sec-
ondary actors as banks and bankers who are in the confidence of such
insiders. The shadow of the TGS rule also fell across commercial lending
and trust departments of banks:
[T]he Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who
may not be strictly termed an "insider".... Thus, anyone in posses-
sion of material inside information must either disclose it to the invest-
ing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed.39
This broadly interpreted rule seemed to extend to virtually anyone in
possession of material information that would affect the optimal condi-
tion of "equal access." In fact, it took the Supreme Court over a decade
to sort out and restrain these implications, and to reestablish firmly the
traditional requirement that an insider trading violation could only be
triggered by the violation of some sort of duty to the contrary. 40 Never-
theless, according to one writer shortly after the decision was handed
down, TGS sent "shock waves [that were].., felt in bankers' offices from
34. See TGS, 401 F.2d at 855.
35. Id. at 848 (citations omitted).
36. But cf Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. Law. 1009, 1010 (1966)
(arguing the opposite).
37. See Chernow, supra note 24, at 562. But see In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C
907, 912 (1961) (articulating an "equal access" rule with respect to such trading by bro-
ker-dealers).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988).
39. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation
omitted).
40. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980) (requiring spe-
cific duty; "mere possession" of inside information affecting equal access rejected as basis
for liability); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (explaining duty underlying tipper-tippee
liability).
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coast to coast."41 Moreover, the dire implications for banks were quite
clear even at this early stage: "Short of an absolute reversal by the
[United States] Supreme Court, it seems clear that it's a new ball game
for those who buy and sell stock on 'inside information[,]' ... [including]
bank officials who, by the nature of their business, are privy to confiden-
tial corporate information. '42
One ominous feature of the insider trading regime that emerged from
TGS becomes apparent when TGS is read in conjunction with the SEC's
1968 settlement of administrative charges against Merrill Lynch for tip-
ping its clients to adverse information about Douglas Aircraft Com-
pany;43 that is, what happens to a tipper who claims to owe a competing
fiduciary duty to those for whom it is acting as fiduciary. In terms of
TGS, the question is whether Morgan had a fiduciary duty to the benefi-
ciaries of the trusts it managed to act on the material information it re-
ceived from Tommy Lamont. In the face of the contrary duty imposed
by Rule lOb-5, this question constitutes a dilemma for bank trust depart-
ments" that may only be resolved by separating off the decisionmaking
of the trust department from other information receptors within the
bank.45 One commentator expressed this dilemma as follows:
It's one thing to say that the executive cannot trade for his own benefit
using material inside information. It's another thing to restrict his ac-
tions in buying and selling securities as a fiduciary. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has no hesitancy about saying that the rule is
the same in both cases.46
B. The Regulatory Response to the Crisis
The period of the mid-1960s was a time of great change in the regula-
tion of bank securities and securities activities. For example, in 1962,
Congress shifted regulatory authority over national bank trust powers
from the Federal Reserve Board (which had controlled them since
41. Alvin L. Arnold, Guidelines for the Banker "Insider" or "7ppee " The Texas
Gulf and Merrill Lynch Decisions, 86 Banking L.J. 319, 319 (1969).
42. Id. at 319. The Supreme Court denied certiorari shortly after the Arnold article
appeared. See Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
43. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
8459, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) 77,629 (Nov. 25, 1968) (accepting offer of settlement in
which respondent and its employees consented to findings that they had violated Rule
lOb-5 by tipping clients that thereafter sold Douglas stock); see also Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (parallel private cause
of action for tipping).
44. See Francis J. Bruzda & Richard B. Seidel, Bank Trust Departments and the lOb-
5 Dilemma, 21 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 368 (1976).
45. See Henry Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Bank Procedures between the Trust
and Commercial Departments, 86 Banking L.J. 869 (1969). See generally Edward S. Her-
man & Carl F. Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall", 14
B.C. Indus. & Commercial L. Rev. 21 (1972) (discussing use of "walls" between bank
commercial and trust departments to cut off informational flows).
46. Arnold, supra note 41, at 322-23.
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1913"7) to the Comptroller of the Currency.4" In April 1963, the Comp-
troller promulgated regulations.49
In August 1964, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act")
was amended to extend its applicability, inter alia, to publicly traded se-
curities of banks and thrift institutions.50 However, administration of the
1934 Act in this regard was entrusted to the federal banking agencies,
rather than the SEC.51 In addition, both the Comptroller and the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board (and its successor, the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision) have long had regulations governing disclosure in connection
with the initial issuance of bank and thrift securities.5 2 Thus, the securi-
ties activities of banks have been thoroughly circumscribed by a regula-
tory scheme.
In particular, the Comptroller's rules have sought to insulate bank
trust department operations from the problem raised by the SEC actions
against TGS and Merrill Lynch. First, a national bank operating a trust
department must "designate, employ or retain" counsel readily available
"to pass upon fiduciary matters and to advise the bank and its trust de-
partment."'53 Thus, it is likely that oversight of a potential lOb-5 di-
lemma will fall to counsel.
Second, interlocking of bank personnel and facilities between the trust
department and other departments is permitted "only to the extent not
prohibited by law."54 The Comptroller offered the following specific gui-
dance with respect to this rule:
Every national bank exercising fiduciary powers shall adopt written
policies and procedures to ensure that the Federal securities laws are
complied with in connection with any decision or recommendation to
purchase or sell any security. Such policies and procedures, in particu-
lar, shall ensure [that] national bank trust departments shall not use
material inside information in connection with any decision or recom-
mendation to purchase or sell any security.55
47. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 261, 262, 265 (1913) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 248(k) (Supp. III 1991)), as amended, Act of Sept. 26, 1918, ch. 177, 40 Stat.
968 (1918); Act of June 26, 1930, ch. 612, 46 Stat. 814 (1930); Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch.
614, 49 Stat. 722 (1935).
48. See Pub. L. No. 87-722, § 1, 76 Stat. 668, 670 (1962) (adding 12 U.S.C. § 92a
(1988); repealing § 248(k)), as amended, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 704, 94 Stat. 187 (1980)
(adding 12 U.S.C. § 92a(k) (1988)).
49. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 9 (1992).
50. See Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 781(g), (i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)); infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (Supp. III 1991); see also Malloy, supra note 7, at 491-93
(discussing applicability of the Act to bank- and thrift-issued securities).
52. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 16 (1992) (prescribing securities offering disclosure rules
for national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 563g (1992) (prescribing OTS disclosure rules for savings
associations). These regulations are equivalent to the requirements of the Securities Act
of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1988).
53. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(c) (1992).
54. Id. § 9.7(d).
55. Id.
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This directive has endorsed the use of protective "walls" between the
operation of a bank's trust department and other departments.
Third, a bank must keep fiduciary records "separate and distinct"
from all other bank records, 56 and it must keep adequate records of all
pending litigation involving the exercise of its fiduciary powers.57
Generally, all of these records must be retained for a period of three
years after the termination of a fiduciary account or of litigation relating
to the account.58 These requirements are primarily intended to facilitate
both information oversight and inquiry by the Comptroller.59
Fourth, a bank's trust department must be audited by a committee of
the bank's outside directors at least once each calendar year, or by a
system of continuous audit.' The auditors must ascertain, among other
things, "whether the department has been administered in accordance
with law."6 This requirement places an affirmative burden on a bank's
outside directors in that it forces them to play a more active role than is
generally required or expected of a general business corporation's outside
directors.
Through such regulatory regimes, state and federal banking agencies
have sought to minimize the potential crisis raised by TGS and its prog-
eny. Yet, a peculiarity exists within the scheme of federal securities regu-
lation that makes it conceptually impossible for banking agencies to
contain the problem within their own regulatory purview: section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act,62 and hence Rule lOb-5, are not included
in the federal securities regulation power given to federal banking agen-
cies with respect to the institutions that they regulate.6a Accordingly,
direct SEC enforcement of Rule lOb-5 against banks remains a
possibility.
II. THE ASSIMILATION OF SECURITIES LAW PRINCIPLES INTO
FEDERAL BANK REGULATION
With respect to the securities of banks and savings associations, the
principles of securities regulation embodied in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"),' do not generally exist as a separate regu-
latory system outside the regime of federal bank regulation. In this Part,
we shall examine the extent to which those principles have been assimi-
lated into federal bank regulation.
At one time, the 1934 Act by its own terms had a more limited scope
56. See id. § 9.8(a).
57. See id. § 9.8(b).
58. See id. § 9.8(c).
59. See id. § 9.8(a), (c).
60. See id. § 9.9. As an alternative to a committee audit, a bank may delegate the
audit to "[outside] auditors responsible only to the board of directors." Id.
61. Id.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
63. See infra notes 77-103 and accompanying text.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (Supp. III 1991).
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than it does now, 65 with the result that, as a purely practical matter, the
Act did not apply to most depository institutions, even those with pub-
licly traded stock. In 1964, following an extensive SEC study of the 1934
Act, 66 Congress amended it,67 expanding the coverage of the Act so that
today it applies generally to publicly traded securities of depository insti-
tutions. Hence, as it exists today, section 12 of the 1934 Act requires
registration of any security that is either (1) traded on a national securi-
ties exchange, 68 or (2) issued by an issuer that falls within the jurisdic-
tional test of the section 69 and that meets certain assets-size and
minimum number of shareholder requirements. 70 If registration is re-
quired under section 12, then the periodic reporting, proxy, tender offer
disclosure, and insider reporting requirements of the Act are imposed
with respect to the issuer's registered securities.
With the enactment of the 1964 Amendments, issuers of securities that
were not registered with a national securities exchange but that were ac-
tively traded "over-the-counter" ("OTC") were brought under the regis-
tration and disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act.71 Thus, a
significant number of OTC securities of national and other large, state-
chartered banks were subjected to those requirements. However, because
there was already pervasive regulation of depository institutions by the
federal regulatory agencies, Congress included section 12(i) in the 1964
amendments. This provision delegated certain authority to the federal
regulatory agencies, to the exclusion of the SEC, with respect to securi-
ties issued by depository institutions.7"
65. See Malloy, supra note 7, at 482-84 (discussing the original scope of the 1934
Act).
66. See id. at 484-87 (discussing the SEC Special Study of Securities Markets).
67. See id. at 487-91 (discussing the legislative history of the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.)).
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1988).
69. See id. § 781(g)(1) (1988) (issuer engaged in interstate commerce; business affect-
ing interstate commerce; or, securities traded by use of mails or means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce).
70. See id. § 781(g)(1)(B) (1988) (total assets in excess of $1 million; 500 or more
shareholders of record). By regulation, the assets-size test for banks has been raised to $3
million. See 12 C.F.R. § 11.201(b) (1992).
71. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat.
565, 566-67 (1964) (adding § 12(g)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1988)).
Section 12(g)(1) of the 1934 Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business affecting
interstate commerce or whose securities are traded by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce shall ... register such security.
Id. For the definition of "equity security" under the 1934 Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1 1)
(1988). Equity securities of which a bank or other depository institution is the issuer are
not "exempted securities" for purposes of the 1934 Act, see id. § 78c(a)(12) (1988),
though they are exempted securities under the 1933 Act. See id. § 77c(a)(2),(5) (1988);
see also Malloy, supra note 7, at 390-93 (discussing the exemption of such securities from
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (Supp. III 1991). 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) reads as follows:
In respect of any securities issued by banks and savings associations the deposits
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Section 12(i) of the 1934 Act73 delegates to the federal banking agen-
cies authority to administer the requirements of the 1934 Act with re-
spect to bank- and thrift-issued securities. In other words, it delegates
the "powers, functions, and duties vested in the [Securities and Ex-
change] Commission to administer and enforce" the enumerated sec-
tions, but not the actual provisions of those sections. 4 The legislative
history of the 1964 Amendments suggests that this administrative and
enforcement authority is limited to the sections enumerated in 12(i). 5
Section 10(b), the general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act, is ab-
sent from section 12(i)'s list of enumerated sections. Therefore, an im-
of which are insured in accordance with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act....
the powers, functions, and duties vested in the Commission to administer and
enforce this section and sections 78m, 78n(a), 78n(c), 78n(d), 78n(f), and 7 8p of
this title [(§§ 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(0, and 16 of the 1934 Act)], (1) with
respect to national banks and banks operating under the Code of Law for the
District of Columbia are vested in the Comptroller of the Currency, (2) with
respect to all other member banks of the Federal Reserve System are vested in
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (3) with respect to all
other insured banks are vested in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and (4) with respect to savings associations the accounts of which are insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are vested in the Office of Thrift
Supervision. The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision shall have the power to make such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary for the execution of the functions vested in them as
provided in this subsection. In carrying out their responsibilities under this sub-
section, the agencies named in the first sentence of this subsection shall issue
substantially similar regulations to regulations and rules issued by the Commis-
sion under this section and sections 78m, 78n(a), 78n(c), 78n(d), 78n(f), and 78p
of this title unless they find that implementation of substantially similar regula-
tions with respect to insured banks and insured institutions are not necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for protection of investors, and publish
such findings, and the detailed reasons therefor, in the Federal Register. Such
regulations of the above-named agencies, or the reasons for failure to publish
such substantially similar regulations to those of the Commission, shall be pub-
lished in the Federal Register within 120 days of October 28, 1974, and, thereaf-
ter, within 60 days of any changes made by the Commission in its relevant
regulations and rules.
Id. (citation omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id.; see supra note 73 (for text of § 781(1)).
75. See generally Investor Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1964) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of William L Cary,
Chairman, SEC); id. at 31 (letter to Rep. Harris from Chairman Cary); id. at 72 (state-
ment of Chairman Cary); id. at 156 (recommendations of the special study that would be
implemented by the bill); id. at 161 (statement of the SEC); id. at 614 (statement of
Hudson B. Lemkau, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors, NASD); id. pt. 2, at 1361-67
(memorandum of the SEC); id. at 1375-77 (letter from American Bankers Association).
Professor Loss takes this same view of the scope of § 12(i): "[T]he enumeration of only a
few sections in § 12(i) leaves jurisdiction in the SEC to apply the various investigatory
provisions and sanctions as far as any other sections, including the fraud and manipula-
tion provisions, are concerned." Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 417
(2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted).
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portant question is whether this omission implies that the agencies
cannot act against fraud in connection with trading of bank-issued secur-
ities. One answer is yes. Because the text of section 12(i) does not itself
indicate which "powers, functions, and duties" 76 of the SEC are vested in
the federal banking agencies, a literal reading of the section excludes au-
thority for direct enforcement of section 10(b). The legislative history of
the 1964 Amendments supports this conclusion.77
A contrary answer is that because section 10(b) is one of the powers,
functions, and duties available to the SEC when administering and en-
forcing the enumerated sections of 12(i), it is also available to bank regu-
latory agencies pursuant to section 12(i). Analysis of this argument
begins with the following principle: the "powers, functions and duties"
available to the bank regulatory agencies under section 12(i) relate to the
sections enumerated in 12(i)."8 These powers include the following: (1)
76. 12 U.S.C. § 781(i) (Supp. III 1991).
77. The debates on the 1964 amendment bill contain explicit references to the delega-
tion to bank regulatory agencies of enforcement authority for certain specifically identi-
fied provisions of the 1934 Act. See, eg., 110 Cong. Rec. 17,916 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Harris, mentioning only §§ 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the Act); see also id. at 17, 918-19 (re-
marks of Rep. Harris); id. at 17,925 (remarks of Rep. Keith); id. at 18,180-81 (remarks of
Rep. Harris). The cosponsors of the Senate version of the bill-the first version to con-
tain the mandatory delegation language of § 12(i)-took the same position. See, e.g., 109
Cong. Rec. 13,725-13,726 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("The Securities Exchange Act
adopted the basic principle of self-regulation to a very large extent .... This was evi-
denced in part by the measure of self-regulation carried on through the stock ex-
changes."); see also id. at 13,728-29 (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("[W]e finally decided that
the regulatory agencies will regulate the affairs of the banks."); Loss, supra note 76, at
417 ("[O]nly the SEC may discipline registered broker-dealers for violation of any provi-
sion of the Exchange Act-including even those specified in § 12(i)-in connection with
bank securities.").
Assuming this argument is correct, the bank regulatory agencies nevertheless do have
authority under the banking laws to take appropriate, indirect enforcement action with
respect to violations of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. This indirect enforcement authority
covers violations committed by depository institutions under their respective authority,
or by any officer, director or person affiliated therewith. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)
(Supp. III 1991). Section 1818(b)(1) provides authority for each federal bank regulatory
agency to issue a notice of charges (which may lead to issuance of a cease-and-desist
order after appropriate notice and hearing) if, for example, in the opinion of the agency,
"any insured depository institution, depository institution which has insured deposits, or
any institution-affiliated party... is violating or has violated, or the agency has reason-
able cause to believe that the depository institution or any institution-affiliated party is
about to violate, a law, rule or regulation." Id. Hence, an alleged violation of Rule lOb-5
by a bank or any "institution-affiliated party" (i.e., directors, officers, employees, or cer-
tain independent contractors) would appear to be a basis for action under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b) (Supp. III 1991). It is in this sense that the text speaks of indirect enforcement
of § 10(b) of the Act. Cf. Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 458, Sept.
1, 1988, reprinted in [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85,682,
at 78,071 (Feb. 10, 1989) (purchase of newly issued shares by bank directors, solely to
"close out" the newly chartered bank's initial offering, with intended subsequent resale,
rendered the offering circular materially false and misleading, in violation of 12 C.F.R.
§ 16.3(g) (1992) and SEC Rule lOb-5).
78. This was the approach the SEC took in commenting on the draft of § 12(i): "For
the purpose of exercising the functions vested in them by [§ 12(i)], these designated Federal
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the power to promulgate rules and regulations that define technical
terms, or to implement and administer the enumerated sections with re-
spect to bank-issued securities;79 (2) the power to "delist" bank-issued
securities that are listed on a national securities exchange;8" (3) the power
to summarily suspend trading in bank-issued securities;"' (4) the power
to issue orders in order to compel compliance with the provisions of sec-
tions 12 and 13 of the 1934 Act; 2 (5) the power to investigate, collect
evidence, and invoke judicial process in support of an investigation; 3 and
(6) the power to initiate civil litigation in order to obtain injunctive relief,
or to refer matters to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution."
These powers are obvious components of the administrative authority
necessary for any agency to "administer and enforce" the provisions of
the 1934 Act. Thus, one must ask whether the rule-making authority
contained in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is also a power necessary to
aid in "administering and enforcing" the other provisions of the Act.
It may be argued that Congress intended a general antifraud rulemak-
ing authority to complement the more specific disclosure-oriented provi-
sions of the enumerated sections in 12(i). 5 If this is so, one could argue
that this "power" is granted to the bank regulatory agencies under sec-
tion 12(i), and, thus, not retained by the SEC. Yet, evidence suggests this
banking agencies would have the authority vested in the Commission under any provision
of the Exchange Act." Technical Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, and S. 1642, House Hearings, supra note 76, at 216 [hereinafter
Technical Statement] (emphasis added). The SEC proceeded to relate the various grants
of authority contained in the 1934 Act-specifically, the sections enumerated in § 12(t).
The SEC did not suggest that power was to be granted to the bank regulatory agencies
under the rule-making authority contained in § 10(b).
79. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78w(c) (1988); see also Technical Statement, supra note
79, at 216 ("For the purpose of exercising the functions vested in them by this section,
these designated federal banking agencies would have the authority vested in the Com-
mission under any provision.").
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(j) (1988). In the SEC's view, the delisting sanction would be
available for violations of the sections enumerated in § 12i). See Technical Statement,
supra note 79, at 216.
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (Supp. III 1991).
82. See id, § 78o(c)(4) (1988).
83. See id § 78u(a)-(c) (1988).
84. See id § 78u(d) (Supp. III 1991); see also id § 78aa (Supp. III 1991) (establishing
United States district courts' exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by the chapter); cf. id. § 78y (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (judicial
review of orders and rules). During congressional consideration of the 1964 amend-
ments, the SEC took the position that such injunctive actions would be available for
violations of the sections enumerated in § 12(i) itself, and, thus, not for injunctive actions
seeking to enforce § 10(b). See Technical Statement, supra note 79, at 216.
85. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 76, at 75-76. SEC Chairman Cary testified
that the absence of adequate disclosure "deprived investors of important bulwarks against
fraud." Id at 75; see also Hearings on S. 1642 before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1963) (same); Statement of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 76, at 165 ("There is no
convincing reason why the comprehensive scheme of disclosure that affords effective pro-
tection to investors in the exchange markets should not also apply in the over-the-counter
market.").
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is not so. While the SEC's contemporaneous explanation of the meaning
of section 12(i) included an identification of the "powers" referred to
above,8 6 it made no reference to the antifraud rulemaking authority of
section 10(b).87 The "powers, functions and duties" that vest in the fed-
eral banking agencies under section 12(i) were also discussed in an indi-
rect exchange of letters between Comptroller Saxon and the SEC
Chairman. Comptroller Saxon, in a letter to the Chairman of the House
Banking Committee,88 took the position that the disclosure requirements
imposed by section 12 on national banks should be exercised under the
National Bank Act and not the federal securities laws,89 and raised a
series of questions concerning the meaning of section 12.90 The SEC
Chairman sent a reply to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee con-
sidering the bill,91 explaining that "[t]he Senate amendment ...also
clarifies the respective responsibilities of the Commission and the Federal
banking agencies by expressly designating the banks that are subject to
the jurisdiction of each Federal banking agency and the specific provisions
of the Exchange Act to be administered and enforced by such agen-
cies."92 Thus, the SEC took the position that the delegation contained in
section 12(i) concerned only those enumerated sections.
Considering the above evidence, one might conclude that all powers
under the 1934 Act not directly related to those sections enumerated in
12(i) remain with the SEC. In fact, the Comptroller's letter touched
upon this implicit conclusion. It specifically asked what powers would
be retained by the SEC.93 The SEC reply provided an overview of the
way in which it conceived the division of authority under section 12(i).
While it did not explicitly mention section 10(b) authority, it clearly im-
plied that this authority was intended to be retained by the SEC.94
86. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
87. See Technical Statement, supra note 79, at 216; see also S. Rep. No. 379, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64 (1963) (discussion of § 12(i) powers).
88. Letter to Chairman Harris from Comptroller Saxon, Feb. 19, 1964, reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 76, at 1356-57 [hereinafter Comptroller's Letter].
89. As early as 1961, the Comptroller, in relying upon his general regulatory author-
ity, had already promulgated rules imposing extensive disclosure requirements on na-
tional banks with respect to their securities. See generally SEC, Report of the Special
Study of Securities Markets, pt. 3, at 39 (1963), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1963) [hereinafter Special Study] (discussing regulation).
90. See id.
91. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the
statement of the Comptroller of the Currency on H.R. 6789 and S. 1642, reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 76, at 1361-67 [hereinafter SEC Memorandum].
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. See Comptroller's Letter, supra note 89, at 1357.
94. See SEC Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1364. In a memorandum, the SEC
stated the following:
[T]he Commission would have the authority to administer and enforce the pro-
visions of the bill only with respect to banks not subject to the jurisdiction of
either the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System or the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation.... It should be noted that [§ 12(i)] would
transfer to the designated Fedral [sic] banking agencies the existing power and
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This view is also corroborated by the terms of another of the Comp-
troller's questions. He asked whether the delegation of authority in sec-
tion 12(i) meant "that the Comptroller will have the powers enumerated
in sections 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the 1934 Act."95 The SEC response
confirmed that the powers of sections 19 and 21-23 of the Act, but not
section 20, would be available to the designated federal banking agen-
cies,9 6 and referred to these provisions as "all the powers of the Commis-
sion contained in the Exchange Act that are necessary for the
administration and enforcement" of the enumerated sections.97 Neither
party mentioned section 10(b).
Furthermore, SEC testimony indicates that the SEC was already exer-
cising antifraud enforcement authority in situations involving over-the-
counter securities, despite the fact that such securities were not otherwise
subject to the requirements of the 1934 Act.98 Therefore, even though, at
the time, section 10(b) was one of the few provisions of federal securities
law applicable to bank-issued securities traded over the counter, it ap-
pears to have been purposefully overlooked in relation to the draft of
section 12(i). Section 10(b) remains one of the "other provisions of the
Exchange Act in respect of bank securities"99 that were not vested in the
bank regulatory agencies but, rather, were retained by the SEC.
One might argue that by denying bank regulatory agencies authority
under section 12(i) to enforce section 10(b) directly, an anomalous result
occurs. For example, where an alleged violation of section 10(b) involves
authority of the Commission to administer and enforce the provisions of sec-
tions 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), and 16 of the Exchange Act in respect of banks with a
security listed for trading on a national securities exchange to the designated
Federal banking agencies. The bill would not, however, affect the Commission's
existing powers to enforce other provisions of the Exchange Act in respect of bank
securities; whether listed for trading on a national securities exchange or traded
in the over-the-counter market.
L. (emphasis added).
95. Comptroller's Letter, supra note 89, at 1357.
96. See SEC Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1365. The SEC specifically stated the
following:
[T]he Federal banking agencies . . . would have the power to delist from a
national securities exchange under section 19(a)(2), to suspend summarily trad-
ing under section 19(a)(4), to investigate, institute suits to enjoin, and forward
evidence to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution under section 21, to
hold public hearings under section 22 and to make such rules as may be neces-
sary to carry out their functions pursuant to the Exchange Act under section
23. The provisions of section 20, relating to liabilities of controlling persons,
also would apply to banks over which the Federal banking agencies would have
jurisdiction. However, this section does not confer any powers upon the Com-
mission and, hence, would not confer power upon the Federal banking agencies.
Id.; cf. supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing the powers available to the
bank regulatory agencies under § 12(i)).
97. SEC Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1365.
98. See, e-g., Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission, House Hearings,
supra note 76, at 165-66. The SEC testimony did not, however, give any examples of
§ 10(b) enforcement actions taken against banks.
99. Id. at 1364.
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a bank officer and other parties outside the bank, the designated bank
regulatory authority would have indirect authority0° to enforce section
10(b) against the bank officer, but not against the outsider. When consid-
ering this scenario, it is arguably more reasonable to include section
10(b) authority under section 12(i) implicitly, so that sanctions can be
applied consistently in any case involving fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of bank-issued securities.
Yet, the above anomaly is not peculiar to the enforcement policy em-
bodied in section 12(i). Moreover, assuming section 10(b) authority is
implied under section 12(i), this does not cure the anomaly. The provi-
sions of 12 U.S.C. § 1818 provide certain enforcement authority to the
federal banking agencies with respect to violations of "a law, rule, or
regulation" by a bank, or by any officer, director, or other institution-
affiliated party. 10' Hence, under 12 U.S.C. § 1818, a federal banking
agency has authority over a section 10(b) violation by a bank officer, re-
gardless of whether or not it involves bank-issued securities; however,
such authority presumably is limited to violations involving bank-issued
securities when pursuant to section 12(i).102
With these limitations in mind, one should ask to what degree the
principles of securities regulation, as embodied in the 1934 Act, have
been assimilated into federal bank regulation? As a general matter,
antifraud authority remains within the exclusive purview of the SEC.
However, affirmative administration of the 1934 Act with respect to
bank- and thrift-issued securities is itself within the exclusive purview of
the bank regulatory agencies. Yet, there has been very little, if any, en-
forcement activity on the part of these agencies with respect to such
securities. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, 0 3 there is reason to
believe that bank regulatory agencies are institutionally uncomfortable
with the disclosure-oriented approach mandated by the federal securities
laws. As a result, the agencies have never fully complied with the re-
quirement, under section 12(i), that they update their 1934 Act regula-
tions promptly in response to corresponding amendments in SEC
regulations."° Instead, the agencies have shifted their attention increas-
ingly over time to a regulatory approach based upon capital supervision
of the institutions under their jurisdiction.
100. Cf. supra note 78 (discussing indirect authority under § 1818).
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (Supp. III 1991) ("In respect of any securities issued by
banks").
103. See Public Disclosure, supra note 8, at 245.
104. See 12(i)'ed Monster, supra note 8, at 289-93.
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III. CAPrrAL SUPERVISION AS A CENTRAL Focus OF FEDERAL
BANK REGULATORY POLICY
A. Introduction
Capital supervision has become the central focus of current federal
bank regulatory policy with respect to banks as securities-issuing entities.
This has occurred primarily because of the convergence of three recent
developments: (1) the United States entered into a multilateral arrange-
ment, °5 effective after December 31, 1992, under which it is expected to
complete the implementation of a risk-based capital-assets ratio to be
used in measuring the adequacy of bank capital; (2) the Department of
the Treasury, in a February 1991 study (the Treasury Modernization
Study),"0 6 advanced certain recommendations to strengthen capital su-
pervision of banks;107 and (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"),0  which was enacted in Decem-
ber 1991, included provisions for increased capital supervision.109
Specifically, the recent Treasury Modernization Study adopted the po-
sition that capital is "[t]he single most powerful tool to make banks
safer."'10 This is a very traditional view of the role of capital in corpo-
rate governance and regulatory oversight of banks. The Treasury ex-
plained as follows:
[Capital] is an "up-front" cushion to absorb losses ahead of the tax-
payer, and banks are less likely to take excessive risk when they have
substantial amounts of their own money at stake. Yet the [deposit in-
surance] safety net has permitted banks to have lower capital ratios
than other financial companies. The bank regulatory system is not
adequately focused on the crucial importance of capital. 1'
There is an inherent analytical confusion contained in this explanation.
105. For a discussion of this arrangement, which was developed under the auspices of
the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland, see infra notes 148-72 and
accompanying text; see also Michael P. Malloy, U.S. International Banking and the New
Capital Adequacy Requirementr New, Old and Unexpected, 7 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 75
(1988) (discussing multilateral initiative on capital adequacy).
106. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Rec-
ommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks (Feb. 1991), reprinted in Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1376 88,367, at 97,335 (Feb. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Treasury Mod-
ernization Study].
107. For a discussion of these recommendations, see infra notes 173-93 and accompa-
nying text.
108. Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 101-502, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.).
109. For a discussion of the FDICIA provisions with respect to capital supervision, see
infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text.
110. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,356.
111. Id. For a detailed treatment of capital and capital adequacy, see id. Discussion
Ch. II (appended to Study; reflecting public comments and comments by agencies partici-
pating in the consultation and study).
Deposit insurance, which is provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") as an insurer, is a feature of United States banking that is very attractive to
bank customers; indeed, it is virtually a necessity for a bank in its marketing of services to
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When the Treasury speaks of banks avoiding "excessive risk when they
have substantial amounts of their own money at stake, ' 12 it is actually
speaking of risk-taking from the point of view of the principal investors
of banks, not of the banks themselves. The Treasury is assuming that
those investors are sufficiently in control of decision-making to influence
the degree of risk undertaken. While this may be a safe assumption in
the case of a relatively small bank, the situation becomes more compli-
cated when a large, publicly held entity is involved. Furthermore, as-
suming that this posited role of investors in selecting risks is valid in the
context of a general business corporation, it is not necessarily valid in the
context of a commercial bank. The funding of a bank's activities comes
primarily from its deposits, not from its equity. 13 Yet, functionally,
there is only a questionable possibility that depositors will perform the
role-usually assigned to equity investors-of selecting risks.' 14 Never-
theless, it is in fact the case that capital and capital supervision have long
been subject to the attention of the regulators, and this attention has in-
creased over time. Thus, this Article will review the four basic aspects of
capital and capital supervision that regulators have focused upon.
1. Capital Formation: Substantive Supervision
Two of the four aspects concern the process of capital formation. The
first has to do with substantive supervision of capital formation. For
chartering agencies" 5I in particular, capital formation by depository insti-
tutions" 6 is a serious concern subject to prior approval.
In the case of national banks, for example, the National Bank Act
the public at large. For a discussion of deposit insurance, see Malloy, supra note 7, at
152-58 (1988 & Cum. Supp.). _
112. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,356.
113. See Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying On Depositors to Control
Bank Risks, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 129 (1986) (discussing roles of depositors and equity in a
commercial bank).
114. The merits and feasibility of relying on depositors to perform such a role-usually
characterized as subjecting banks to "market discipline"-was the subject of a series of
articles in successive issues of the Yale Journal on Regulation. See id. (arguing that mar-
ket discipline was not feasible in light of probable depositor behavior); Helen A. Garten,
Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of Market Discipline, 5 Yale J.
on Reg. 241 (1988) (criticizing market discipline arguments); Helen A. Garten, Whatever
Happened to Market Discipline of Banks?, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 749 (reviewing the
demise of market discipline arguments); Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garret, Mar-
ket Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5
Yale J. on Reg. 215 (1988) (arguing for increased reliance on market discipline).
115. The Comptroller of the Currency, which is the chartering authority for national
banks, is an example of a chartering agency. See 12 U.S.C. § 1, 21-27 (1988 & Supp. III
1991). Another chartering agency is the Office of Thrift Supervision (federal chartering
authority of savings associations). See id. § 1464 (Supp. III 1991). See generally Malloy,
supra note 7, at 100-25 (1988 & Cum. Supp.) (discussion of chartering procedures for
national and state banks); id. at 159-81 (1988 & Cum. Supp.) (discussion of chartering
procedures for federal and state savings associations).
116. On the meaning of the term "depository institution," as used in this context, see
supra note 10.
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("NBA") permits the issuance of common stock 1 7 and, since 1933, pre-
ferred stock,' subject to the approval of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency. In the case of an initial offering at the organization stage, the
Comptroller may approve or disapprove charter applications in light of,
inter alia, the particular level of capital to be achieved by the applicant
bank in organization."' Changes in outstanding equity capital are also
subject to prior approval by the Comptroller."2 The Comptroller will
approve changes in capital so long as "the change complies with applic-
able statutes and regulations and the bank has provided the information
requested by the [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC")]."121
2. Capital Formation: Minimum Capital Requirements
The second aspect concerning the process of capital formation has to
do with minimum capital requirements for depository institutions in or-
ganization. The imposition of minimum capital requirements addresses
fundamental concerns regarding the safety and soundness of de novo in-
stitutions."w Minimum capital requirements are a traditional element of
the regulation of depository institutions. Yet, for the most part, these
requirements currently have only minimal significance. This is because
regulatory emphasis on continuing capital adequacy requirements' 3 ap-
pears to provide a more effective method of monitoring the safety and
soundness of depository institutions.
The NBA provides one example of minimum capital requirements. 24
It calculates minimum capital requirements in relation to the size of the
community in which a proposed national bank is to be located.'" The
117. See 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
118. See id § 51a (1988).
119. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(d)(3)(iii) (1992):
The Office [of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")] may grant prelimi-
nary conditional approval to an application which proposes an unacceptable
level of capital, if the application as a whole would warrant approval had capital
been proposed at a level acceptable to the [OCC]. However, preliminary ap-
proval will be conditioned upon the bank raising the amount of capital required
by the [OCC] prior to the commencement of business.
Id The requirement that approval by the OCC be obtained for capital formation by a de
novo national bank renders ambiguous the provision included in the OCC's requirements
that a bank's offering circular include a boldface disclaimer which states "THE MERITS
OF THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN PASSED UPON BY THE COMP-
TROLLER OF THE CURRENCY...." Id. § 16.7(c), item I(d).
120. See id § 5.46(c). Changes in outstanding equity capital involving offers and sales
of equity securities also require compliance with the OCC's offering circular require-
ments. See id; id § 16.1-.8.
121. Id. § 5.46(f)(1).
122. On the concept of "safety and soundness" as a bank regulatory concern, see supra
note 4.
123. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
124. See 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(c)(3) (1992). For capital require-
ments of state banks converting to a national charter, see 12 C.F.R. § 5.24 (1992).
125. See 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). "Capital," as interpreted by the OCC for these pur-
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NBA also requires that a national bank have a paid-in-surplus 126 equal to
twenty percent of capital before it can commence business. 127 However,
the NBA provisions have not been revised since the early 1930s,' 28 and
are hopelessly out of date. By regulation, the OCC has established
higher minimum capital requirements ("in excess of $1,000,000,'1129 net
of organizational expenses 13 ), but it will permit the initial capital of an
applicant bank to be a lesser amount "if the applicant can show that [the]
proposed capital is sufficient to support the projected volume and type of
business."' 3' Thus, the actual amount of initial capital required depends
upon the Comptroller's judgment as to projected volume and type of
business contemplated for the proposed bank in its operating plan. 3 2
The regulations of the Federal Reserve System (the "Fed") concerning
eligibility standards include general references to minimum capital re-
quirements.133 As to the eligibility for federal deposit insurance of state-
poses, includes "the amount of common stock outstanding and unimpaired plus the
amount of perpetual preferred stock outstanding and unimpaired." 12 C.F.R. § 3.100(a)
(1992).
126. The Comptroller has interpreted the term "surplus" to include the following:
(1) capital surplus;
(2) undivided profits;
(3) reserves for contingencies and other capital reserves (excluding accrued pre-
ferred dividends);
(4) net worth certificates issued pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
("FDIA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(i);
(5) minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries; and
(6) allowances for possible loan and lease losses;
minus intangible assets.
See 12 C.F.R. § 3.100(c)(1) (1992); cf. id. § 3.100(e)(3) (defining intangible assets as
purchased assets reported as intangible in accordance with the Call Report). "Surplus"
also includes the following:
(7) purchased mortgage servicing rights;
(8) mandatory convertible debt, to the extent of 20% of the sum of capital and
surplus items discussed above; and
(9) other mandatory convertible debt, limited life preferred stock and
subordinated notes and debentures, subject to the limitations of 12 C.F.R.
§ 3.100(f)(2).
See id. § 3.100(c)(2)-(4). "Paid-in surplus" may be equated with "capital surplus," which
has been defined by the Comptroller, in pertinent part, as "the total of those accounts
reflecting: [(1)] [a]mounts paid in in excess of the par or stated value of capital stock;
[(2)] [a]mounts contributed to the bank other than for capital stock. . . ." Id.
§ 3. 100(e)(2)(i)-(ii). The term "unimpaired surplus fund" is interpreted by the Comptrol-
ler as being coterminous with "surplus." See id. § 3.100(d).
127. See 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
128. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 162, 185-86 (1933) (amending
12 U.S.C. § 51).
129. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(d)(3)(iii) (1992).
130. On organizational expenses, see id. § 5.20(d)(4)(iii).
131. Id. § 5.20(d)(3)(iii).
132. See id.
133. See id. § 208.2; see also id. § 208.5(a)(2) (approval of membership applications;
adequacy of capital); id. § 208.7(a)(2) (conditions of membership). See generally Conti-
nental Bank & Trust Co. v. Woodall, 239 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.) (upholding Fed eligibility
requirements), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 909 (1957).
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chartered, non-member banks, the FDIA requires adequacy of capital;
the FDIC has taken a position similar to that of the OCC in this re-
gard.135 Likewise, approval of applications for de novo federal mutual
and stock savings associations by the OTS are conditioned on capital
requirements. 136
3. Adequate Disclosure
Adequate disclosure to investors of material information concerning
the issuer and its securities is a third aspect of capital supervision of
banks. In the context of initial offerings of securities, the federal banking
agencies have disclosure requirements that are parallel to, but indepen-
dent of, the rules of the SEC (as promulgated under the Securities Act of
1933). 13  As we have already seen, 138 continuing disclosure requirements
for banks with publicly traded securities are derived from the 1934
Act.1 39 These requirements are administered and applied by the bank
regulators, not by the SEC."4°
4. Capital Adequacy
Over the past decade or so, increasing attention has been given to the
supervision of capital adequacy, or capital maintenance, of depository
institutions. To the extent that inadequate capital maintenance consti-
tutes an "unsafe and unsound practice," bank regulators have broad stat-
utory authority to define and remedy such a condition.' 4 1 The use of this
authority to address capital adequacy concerns was questioned by the
Fifth Circuit in First National Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency,'42
but the authority appears to have been confirmed and reinforced by sub-
134. See 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1988).
135. See 12 C.F.R. § 303.7(d)(1)(ii)(B)(1) (1992).
136. See id. § 543.2(g)(3)(ii) (federal mutual association; minimum amount of capital
to be paid in); id. § 552.2-I(b)(3)(ii) (federal stock association; sale of minimum amount
of capital stock).
137. See Malloy, supra note 7, at 411-41 (discussing bank regulatory rules with respect
to initial offerings).
138. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
139. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (b), (g) (1988); Malloy, supra note 7, at 498-525 (discuss-
ing 1934 Act rules applicable to bank-issued securities).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (Supp. III 1991).
141. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991); cf. Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller
of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1978) (progressive definition of unsafe and
unsound practices); First Nat'l Bank v. Dep't of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610 (8th Cir.
1978) (same). Similar authority has been upheld in the bank holding company context.
See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S.
234 (1978). But cf. MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900
F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990) (invalidating Fed regulations concerning capital maintenance of
bank holding companies in relation to their banking subsidiaries), rey'd on other grounds,
112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
142. 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983). An unreported opinion of the Second Circuit up-
held the Comptroller's authority to treat capital adequacy problems as unsafe and un-
sound banking practices. See First Nat'l Bank v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 659
F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1981). The District Court for the District of Columbia referred to this
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sequent congressional action.' 43 Pursuant to that authority, the federal
banking agencies developed specific capital adequacy requirements,
based upon a minimum required ratio of capital-to-assets. 144
The regulatory maintenance of capital adequacy of depository institu-
tions has become the central theme of capital supervision. The three
most recent developments concerning capital supervision145 all revolve
around or presuppose the maintenance of capital adequacy as a primary
objective.
B. The Risk-Based Capital-Assets Ratio
The basic direction of capital adequacy regulation today was initiated
by the Basle Agreement of 1988,146 which is now in the final stages of
implementation. 147 The objective of the Basle Agreement is to "assess[ ]
opinion in related litigation. See First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 162, 165
(D.D.C. 1982).
143. See 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a)(1) Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall cause banking institu-
tions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels
of capital for such banking institutions ....
(2) Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall have the authority to es-
tablish such minimum level of capital for a banking institution as the appropri-
ate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, deems to be necessary or
appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the banking institution.
(b)(1) Failure of a banking institution to maintain capital at or above its min-
imum level as established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section may be
deemed by the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, to consti-
tute an unsafe and unsound practice within the meaning of [12 U.S.C. § 1818].
(2)(A) In addition to, or in lieu of, any other action authorized by law, in-
cluding paragraph (1), the appropriate Federal banking agency may issue a di-
rective to a banking institution that fails to maintain captial [sic] at or above its
required level as established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
(B)(i) Such directive may require the banking institution to submit and ad-
here to a plan acceptable to the appropriate Federal banking agency describing
the means and timing by which the banking institution shall achieve its required
capital level.
(ii) Any such directive .... including plans submitted pursuant thereto, shall
be enforceable under the provisions of [12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)] to the same extent
as an effective and outstanding order issued pursuant to section 1818(b)...
which has become final.
Id.
144. For a discussion of these requirements, see Malloy, supra note 7, at 452-66.
145. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text; infra part III.B.
146. Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Bank for
International Settlements, Final Report for International Convergence of Capital Mea-
surement and Capital Standards Dec. 1987, reprinted in I Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
5403 (Nov. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Final Report]. For an excellent discussion of the impli-
cations of the capital adequacy initiative, see William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank
Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1365 (1989).
147. See Final Report, supra note 148, at 3315. For a summary and analysis of the
regulatory implementation of the risk-based capital adequacy regime as of December
1992, see Report to Congressional Committees Regarding Differences in Capital and Ac-
counting Standards Among the Federal Banking and Thrift Agencies, 58 Fed. Reg. 3019
(1993); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 33,432 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 561, 563, 563C,
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capital in relation to credit risk (the risk of counterparty failure)."' 48
The Agreement acknowledges, however, that "other risks, notably inter-
est rate risk and the investment risk on securities, need to be taken into
account by supervisors in assessing overall capital adequacy."' 4 9 New
approaches to these elements of risk are currently being explored by the
federal banking agencies. 150
The supervisory framework endorsed by the Basle Agreement consists
of a minimum'51 required ratio of certain specified constituents of capital
to risk-weighted assets. "Capital" has two constituents: "core capi-
tal"152 and "supplementary capital."'153 Core capital consists of (1) eq-
uity capital 54 and (2) disclosed reserves. 155 Supplementary capital
consists of (1) hidden reserves; 156 (2) revaluation reserves; 157 (3) general
provisions or loan loss reserves; 58 (4) certain hybrid debt capital instru-
567, 571) (OTS regulations; technical and clarifying amendments to risk-based capital
requirements); id. at 44,078 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3) (OCC regulations; same);
id. at 46,098 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 563, 567, 571) (OTS proposed rule;
treatment of troubled, collateral-dependent loans and foreclosed assets).
148. Final Report, supra note 148, at 3309.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 35,507 (1992) (OCC, Fed & FDIC proposed rules; incorpo-
rating interest-rate risk component into risk-based capital requirements); id. at 40,524 (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 567) (OTS proposed rule; same); id. at 45,757 (OTS proposed
rule; incorporating concentration risk and risk of nontraditional activities into risk-based
capital requirements).
151. See Final Report, supra note 148, at 3309 ("It should be stressed that the agreed
framework is designed to establish minimum levels of capital for internationally active
banks. National authorities will be free to adopt arrangements that set higher levels.").
152. See id. at 3310. See generally id. at 3316 annex 1 (definition of capital).
153. See id at 3310-11. See generally id at 3316 annex 1 (definition of capital).
154. The Final Report defines "equity capital" as "[i]ssued and fully paid ordinary
shares/common stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (but excluding cu-
mulative preferred stock)." Id at 3310 n.2.
155. Disclosed reserves are from post-tax retained earnings. See id. at 3310.
156. Hidden reserves are included only to the extent permitted by local legal and ac-
counting rules. See id Moreover, they are included in supplementary capital only to the
extent they "have been passed through the profit and loss account and [have been] ac-
cepted by [a] bank's supervisory authorities." Id.
157. See id. at 3310-11. Revaluation reserves are included only to the extent permitted
by local legal and accounting rules. In addition, "latent revaluation" reserves are subject
to a substantial discount reflecting, for example, market volatility and any tax effect of
realization of the gain. See id at 3311. It has been agreed that a 55% discount on the
difference between historical cost book value and current market value is appropriate in
this regard. See id.
158. Reserves against identified losses or with respect to "known deterioration in the
valuation of particular assets" are not included in this category. See id. What constitutes
a "general" reserve or provision for these purposes is not always easy to determine. In
situations where nominally "general" reserves or provisions might include amounts re-
flecting lower valuations for assets or latent but unidentified losses, the amount qualifying
as supplementary capital is phased down by the end of the transition to constitute no
more than 1.25% (or up to 2% during exceptional and temporary periods) of supple-
mentary capital. See id at 3311, 3320 annex 4.
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ments; 15 9 and, to a limited extent, (5) subordinated term debt. 160
The Basle Agreement also mandates certain deductions from capital.
Goodwill must be deducted from the figure in order to get core capital. 16
1
The amount of investments in unconsolidated banking and financial sub-
sidiaries, if any, 162 must be deducted from the total capital base.1 63
In determining the capital-to-assets ratio of a bank, the assets that ap-
pear in the denominator of the ratio are risk-weighted.164 The Basle
Agreement establishes a relatively simple methodology for risk-weighting
which employs only five risk-weight categories. 165 The result is that dif-
ferent types of assets are grouped under the same risk weight, even
though there may be actual differences in the risk involved. 166
There is a possibility that the assignment of different risk weights to
certain types of assets will have the inadvertent effect of influencing
banks to rearrange their loan portfolios in order to move out of certain
categories of loans and into others. 167 The Basle Agreement's framework
does not adequately address these potential problems. However, the
framework does recognize the importance of bringing off-balance-sheet
risk into the analysis of capital adequacy.' 68  All categories of off-bal-
ance-sheet risk are brought within the framework by conversion into ap-
propriate credit risk equivalents.169 The minimum required ratio of
capital-to-assets is currently eight percent, of which half must consist of
core capital.170
C. The Treasury Modernization Study
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA") 171 has had both immediate and long-term conse-
159. This category includes mandatory convertible debt instruments (in U.S. practice),
perpetual debt instruments (in U.K. practice), long-term preferred shares (in Canadian
practice), titres participatifs and titres subordonnis d durde inddterminde (in French prac-
tice), or Genussscheine (in German practice). See id. at 3311.
160. Subordinated term debt instruments may be included up to an amount equal to
50% of total core capital. See id.
161. See id.
162. The Final Report generally assumes the normal practice-i.e., that such subsidi-
aries would be consolidated for the purpose of assessing capital adequacy. See id.
163. See id. at 3311-12. The Agreement allows for other deductions, subject to the
discretion of the individual national supervisory authorities. See id. at 3312.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 3317 annex 2 (risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet asset).
166. For example, all claims on the private sector, regardless of size or creditworthi-
ness of the borrower, and all claims on lesser developed countries denominated in foreign
currency are grouped together in one risk-weight category (100% of asset value). See id.
167. For example, one might readily move from lending to the private sector (100%
risk weight) to debt obligations of the United States government (0% risk weight) or
home mortgage lending (50% risk weight). See id.
168. See id. at 3314 (discussion of off-balance-sheet risk).
169. See id. at 3317-19 annex 3.
170. See id. This ratio was set at year-end 1992, the end of the framework's transi-
tional period.
171. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at scattered sections of, inter alia, 12
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quences for the regulation of depository institutions in the United States.
Among the potential long-term effects of the FIRREA are those reflected
in the Treasury Modernization Study (the "Study"),"7 2 which is based
upon an eighteen-month interagency consultation and study mandated
by the FIRREA 1
73
The Study paints a rather discouraging picture of the United States
depository institutions industry; a picture that, when compared with the
history of the S&L crisis, prompts a sense of ddjd vu. Consider, for exam-
ple, the following observations from the executive summary of the Study,
which comment on the need for modernization of the United States fi-
nancial system:
[T]he competitiveness of the banking industry has been undercut by
our failure to adapt our banking laws to the evolution of financial mar-
kets, which has brought vigorous new competition to markets tradi-
tionally served by banks....
Having lost traditional customers to new competitors, banks have
increased their concentration on remaining customer segments.
Weaker banks with virtually unlimited access to federally guaranteed
funds have chased too few good lending opportunities, which has cre-
ated problems for healthier banks: underpriced loans, narrowed
spreads, eroded underwriting standards, and incentives to reach for
riskier loans within the range of traditional bank activities. The result
is diminished profitability, which has undercut the safety and sound-
ness of the banking system....
[D]eposit insurance coverage has expanded well beyond its original
purpose of protecting small unsophisticated depositors.... This over-
extension of deposit insurance has dramatically increased taxpayer
exposure.
Overextended deposit insurance has removed market discipline that
should have constrained the increased riskiness of weak banks....
[W]ith expanded federal insurance and no risk of loss, depositors have
been more than willing to supply funds to weaker banks engaged in
activities that produce inadequate returns and excessive risk. With so
little to lose, these weak, undercapitalized banks have had a perverse
incentive to take excessive risk-the "moral hazard" problem--expos-
ing the taxpayer to even greater losses.
[Bjank regulation and supervision helps provide a substitute for the
market discipline removed by deposit insurance. But in the face of the
problems discussed above, our fragmented and archaic regulatory sys-
tem has not been successful in stemming the weakening of the banking
& 15 U.S.C.). On the FIRREA, see generally Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A
Decade's Journey from "Deregulation" to "Supervisory Reregulation ". The Financial In-
stitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. Law. 1103 (1990);
Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, The Financial Institutions Reform. Recovery. and
Enforcement Act of 1989: Dealing with the Regulators, 107 Banking LJ. 196 (1990);
Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself Revising and Reshaping the En-
forcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 1117 (1989).
172. See supra note 107.
173. FIRREA § 1001 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. III 1991)).
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industry. In recent years, banks have experienced record loan losses
and failures that are rapidly depleting the deposit insurance fund....
[T]he Bank Insurance Fund... is at its lowest level in history as a
percentage of insured deposits. It is projected to decline still further
over the next two years. Without an infusion of funds, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . could face the problems that
plagued the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation-too lit-
tle cash, too many incentives for forbearance, and possible exposure for
the taxpayer.
1 74
Against this background, the Study made a number of dramatic rec-
ommendations for legislative reform of the financial services system.' 7 s
At its core, the Study recommended that increased supervision be en-
couraged by improving the techniques and tools of supervision, primarily
through an increased focus on capital. 176 In the context of general super-
vision, the Study also stressed the need for "prompt corrective action,"' 177
but this was attuned to the relative capital strength of a subject bank
(ranging from "Zone 1" for the most capitalized to "Zone 5" for failing
institutions). 178 In addition, the Study stressed the need for annual on-
site examination 179 and improved reporting from independent auditors18
as crucial aids for improved supervision. Yet, it is fair to say that capital
supervision was the key theme of the Study."8
As has already been mentioned,"8 2 the Study takes a very traditional
174. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,336-37. Among other
things, the Study recommended the recapitalization of the BIF. See id. at 97,392-96. A
capital infusion was authorized by the FDICIA. See FDICIA, § 104 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A), (C) (Supp. III 1991)) (assessment rate changes; rules for recapi-
talizing the BIF); see also id. § 105 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1824(d) (Supp. III 1991))
(borrowing for BIF from BIF members).
175. For an extended discussion of the recommendations made by the Study, see
Michael P. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks 49-50, 81-84, 169-70, 284-86, 321-22,
374, 449-50 (Supp. 1992).
176. See Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,337; ef. id. Discussion
Ch. IX (appended to-Study; discussing risk management techniques and reflecting public
comments and comments by agencies participating in the consultation and study); id.
Discussion Ch. X (appended to Study; discussing the need for prompt corrective action
and reflecting public comments and comments by agencies participating in the consulta-
tion and study).
177. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,374. FDICIA included
prompt corrective action as a major improvement in the regulatory scheme. See, e.g.,
FDICIA, § 131(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (Supp. III 1991)) (prompt corrective
action required). The agencies have already begun to implement this provision. See 57
Fed. Reg. 29,662 (1992) (FDIC proposed rule); id. at 29,808 (OCC proposed rule); id. at
29,826 (OTS proposed rule); id. at 44,866 (OCC, Fed, FDIC & OTS final rules).
178. See Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,373-76.
179. See id. at 97,375. The FDICIA included annual on-site examination as one of its
improvements in the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., FDICIA, § 111(a) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1820(d) (Supp. III 1991)) (annual on-site examinations required for all deposi-
tory institutions).
180. See Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,376-77.
181. In fact, as stated earlier, the Study views capital as the "single most powerful
tool" in the supervision of banks. Id. at 97,356.
182. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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view of the role of capital in corporate governance and regulation; a view
that may be of limited usefulness in achieving the regulatory objectives of
safety and soundness in banking. It may be significant, however, that the
Study did not recommend that capital standards be raised, but, rather,
recommended that "the role of capital ... be strengthened."' 83
Although it is arguably anomalous to speak of "strengthening" the
role of capital without raising capital standards, the Study detailed a se-
ries of recommendations that gave substance to this position. First, it
recommended that the bank regulatory system give greater emphasis to a
bank's relative capital level as an indicator of the degree of supervision
that its regulator should exercise.'8 4 However, the notion of using capi-
tal levels in this manner is already a recognized element of bank supervi-
sion.18 5 Thus, a question exists concerning whether the regulators are
effectively utilizing the supervisory techniques already within their
authority.
Second, the Study recommended an assessment of deposit insurance
premiums on the basis of risk, with risk measured on the basis of a bank's
risk-based capital level.' 6 The FDICIA has already mandated such a
risk-based assessment system.' 7
Third, the Study recommended that "financial services holding com-
panies" with well-capitalized bank subsidiaries be permitted to engage in
a range of financial activities through nonbanking affiliates.' 8 The
Treasury expected that the promise of a broader range of activities would
encourage banks to build and maintain capital, and would enhance mar-
ket prospects for new issues made by previously undercapitalized
banks.189
Fourth, the Study noted that the current risk-based capital standards
did not significantly focus on interest rate risk in evaluating the relative
risk of bank assets. 9 It urged the development of methods to monitor
interest rate risk and to adjust risk-based capital ratios accordingly, in
order to avoid "banks... shift[ing] into assets that are more sensitive to
interest rate risk." 191
183. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,356.
184. See id. at 97,360; see also id. at 97,373-76 (discussing capital-based supervision as
an element of improved supervision).
185. See, eg., Malloy, supra note 7, at 455-57 (discussing Fed regulations; higher de-
gree of oversight for banks with relatively low capital ratios); id. at 458 (discussing FDIC
regulations; same); cf. id at 453-54 (discussing OCC regulations; higher levels of capital
required for higher degree of risk in operation of national bank).
186. See Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,360.
187. See FDICIA, § 302(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(l)-(2) (Supp. III 1991))
(mandating a risk-based assessment system).
188. See Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,360.
189. See id.
190. See id. But see supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing recent efforts to
include interest-rate risk).
191. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 107, at 97,360.
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D. FDICIA and Capital Supervision
In December 1991, President Bush signed the FDICIA into law. 192 It
included a series of provisions intended to improve supervision of insured
depository institutions, with a significant emphasis on capital supervision
as a primary tool.
The FDICIA adopted a general rule requiring annual on-site examina-
tions of all insured depository institutions, 193 effective one year after en-
actment (December 19, 1991).194 However, certain specified small
institutions-well-capitalized and well-managed institutions with total
assets of less than $100 million and no recent change in control-are to
be examined every eighteen months. 195
The FDICIA generally requires "prompt corrective action"'196 by reg-
ulators to "resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the
least possible long-term loss to the deposit insurance fund."' 197 Such ac-
tion includes the implementation of capital standards. 19 A related
FDICIA provision amends the conservatorship and receivership provi-
sions of the FDIA, 199 the National Bank Act,2 "o the Bank Conservation
Act,20' the Home Owners' Loan Act,2 2 and the Federal Reserve Act 20 3
to facilitate prompt regulatory action.
The FDICIA focuses upon the safety and soundness of insured deposi-
tory institutions in several ways. It authorizes federal banking agencies
to impose more stringent treatment of capital where an institution is de-
termined to be in an unsafe and unsound condition, or to be engaged in
an unsafe and unsound practice.2 4 It also requires federal banking agen-
192. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (Dec. 19, 1991) (codified at scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
193. See FDICIA § I11(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1)-(3) (Supp. III 1991)).
194. See id. § 11l(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1820 nt).
195. See id. § I11(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(4) (Supp. III 1991)). But see id.
§ 111(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1820 nt) (transition rule).
196. Id. § 131 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991)).
197. Id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991)); cf. id. § 141(a), (e)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)-(l 1) (Supp. 1111991)) (mandating least-cost resolution
of failing institution problems). On principles of early resolution, see id. § 143 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1820 nts); see also id. § 141(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(D)
(Supp. III 1991)) (authorizing receiver to disallow secured claims in excess of collateral);
id. § 142 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 347a, 347b(a)-(b) (Supp. 111 1991)) (limiting Federal
Reserve discount window advances).
198. See id. § 131 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)-(f), (h)-(i), (k), (n) (Supp. III
1991)). These rules do not apply to depository institutions in conservatorship, or to
bridge banks the stock of which is owned only by the FDIC or RTC. See id. (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1831o(j) (Supp. III 1991)). The Act also contains provisions requiring the
periodic review and improvement of applicable capital standards. See id. § 305 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(I)-(2) (Supp. III 1991)).
199. Id. § 133(a), (e) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5), (9)-(13) (Supp. 111 1991)).
200. Id. § 133(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 191 (Supp. III 1991)).
201. Id. § 133(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 203(a) (Supp. III 1991)).
202. Id. § 133(d) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A).(F) (Supp. III 1991)).
203. Id. § 133(0 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248(p) (Supp. III 1991)).
204. See id. § 131(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(g) (Supp. I1 1991)).
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cies to create detailed standards for safety and soundness of insured de-
pository institutions and their holding companies" in specified areas of
concern (such as operational and managerial standards," asset quality,
earnings, and stock valuation standards,' 7  and compensation
standards20 ).
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to show how TGS and its progeny
created the conditions for a crisis in bank regulatory policy. Because of a
relative indifference to the interactions between bank trust and commer-
cial departments, banks could have been subjected to a concerted assault
on the trading practices of their trust departments with respect to the
securities of customers of bank commercial departments. Regulations
encouraging or mandating various protective "walls" between such de-
partments blunted this crisis in part.
However, Rule lOb-5 remains a serious consideration for banks and
bankers who, by the very nature of their activities, are naturally sub-
jected to many temptations with respect to the illicit use of material in-
side information in securities trading. While the federal banking agencies
have managed to assimilate and control the direct application of securi-
ties regulation to banks, it is almost beyond doubt that the SEC retains
control of the direct application of Rule lOb-5. Furthermore, the in-
creasing trend of banking enterprises taking a holding company form2"9
has increased SEC jurisdiction over the depository institutions industry,
since federal banking agency securities jurisdiction does not apply to
holding companies."'
Yet, certain troubling trends are apparent in the current state of regu-
lation affecting banks and other depository institutions. To the extent
that the federal banking agencies retain authority over securities regula-
tion, they have, with striking consistency over the past three decades,
205. See id, § 132(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831p (Supp. III 1991)).
206. See id (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831p(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991)).
207. See id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831p(b) (Supp. III 1991)).
208. See id (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831p(c) (Supp. III 1991)).
209. See generally Anthony G. Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liber-
alization of the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 Geo. L.J. 1225, 1233-36 (1972) (describ-
ing the expansion of one-bank holding companies); Maurice Mann, The Reality and
Promise of Bank Holding Companies, 90 Banking L.J. 181, 181-82 (1973) (discussing a
recent "splurge" in bank holding companies); Benjamin P. Shapiro, The One-Bank Hold-
ing Company Movement: An Overview, 86 Banking L.J. 291 (1969) (discussing a move-
ment towards one-bank holding companies). Indeed, as of 1990, only approximately 70
national banks that were unaffiliated with a holding company were required to report
under the 1934 Act, and only approximately 34 member banks, 240 FDIC-insured non-
member banks, and 318 savings associations were required to report. See 12(i)'ed Mon-
ster, supra note 8, at 288 nn. 115-16.
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (Supp. III 1991) ("In respect of any securities issued by
banks and savings associations.") (emphasis added).
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delayed publication of current securities regulation amendments21' and
appeared relatively indifferent to enforcement of securities laws as
applied to depository institutions.212 This institutional bias raises doubts
about the effectiveness and advisability of allowing securities regulation
with respect to depository institutions to be coopted by the federal bank-
ing agencies.
Furthermore, over the past ten years, we have seen a decisive re-
orientation of bank regulatory policy in favor of "capital supervision" as
a basic approach to the regulation of depository institutions. To the ex-
tent that this reorientation turns regulatory policy further away from the
techniques of full and fair continuous disclosure, we must ask if this is an
appropriate approach to problems that publicly held institutions may
face. Here, there are two causes for concern.
First, this reorientation toward capital supervision may reinforce the
federal banking agencies' institutional bias against the vigorous use of
public disclosure techniques. This possibility itself repudiates the funda-
mental decision of Congress to subject depository institutions to the re-
gime of federal securities law. Second, it is far from certain that the
preoccupation with capital supervision as a central feature of bank regu-
latory policy is a satisfactory technique on its own terms. Capital super-
vision, at least as advanced by the Treasury Modernization Study, is
premised on a questionable assumption concerning the likely effective
role of capital and bank investors in corporate governance.213 Risk-based
capital adequacy standards may provide a useful analytical tool to the
supervisor, but they only have an indirect and highly circumspect effect
on such problems as safe and sound management of a bank's loan portfo-
lio (its most significant category of assets). In fact, risk-weighting of as-
sets may have the unintended effect of artificially pushing a bank out of,
for example, lending to the private commercial sector (risk-weighted at
100% of asset value) and into, for example, home mortgage lending
(risk-weighted at 50% of asset value) or public sector lending (risk-
weighted variously from 0% to 50% of asset value).214
The central concept of banking regulation- the maintenance of safety
and soundness of the depository institutions industry-has at its heart,
among other things, a concern with the perfidy of human nature. That
is, it is concerned with the fact that things often go wrong because people
make mistakes, often intentionally or recklessly. A "capital-intensive"
approach to supervision and examination assumes that the analytical
techniques embodied in the tools of capital supervision can effectively
211. See, e.g., 12(i)'ed Monster, supra note 8, at 306-09 (charting the consistent pattern
of delays in promulgating regulations).
212. See, e.g., Public Disclosure, supra note 8, at 245 & n.90 (citing the "paucity of
examples of active enforcement of the securities laws by the bank regulators").
213. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
214. See Final Report, supra note 148, at 3317 annex 2 (charting various risk weights
for different categories of assets).
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ensure safety and soundness in that regard. Thus, the labor-intensive ap-
proach, which supports direct examination of the asset portfolio and its
management, and employs a large, well-trained, experienced, and knowl-
edgeable examination force on site, may well become a thing of the past.
Ironically, Rule lOb-5, which is rooted in the common law tradition of
fraud and deceit, is also premised on a concern with the perfidy of human
nature.215 Thus, if the now pervasive policy of capital supervision does
not assuage the ills of banking, such labor-intensive devices as Rule lOb-5
may reemerge in yet another paradigm shift in banking's regulatory
regime.
215. One may argue that § 10(b) of the 1934 Act "'says, "Thou shalt not devise any
other cunning devices."' " Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976) (quot-
ing congressional testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, spokesman for drafters of § 10(b)).

